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Sergey Kirsanov, a Russian blogger based in Italy, is today known for his incendiary rhetoric that combines pro-Kremlin narratives, anti-Ukrainian hate speech, and increasingly xenophobic commentary. His path from obscure church circles to political opposition, then into Ukrainian advocacy, and finally into open propaganda is marked by opportunism, abrupt reversals, and a talent for rebranding himself according to shifting political winds.
Early Life and Orthodox Ties
Official records indicate that Kirsanov was born in 1987 in Baku, though he insists it was Rostov, dismissing the discrepancy as a bureaucratic mistake. His father served as a military officer, with a posting in Poland, while his mother’s religious devotion shaped his early education. Classmates describe him as socially isolated, alternating between regular and church schools, and often ostracized for his unusual upbringing.
Despite his provincial background, Kirsanov gained access to elite Orthodox Church circles. He appeared alongside Father Artemiy, later a prominent state propagandist, and received a recommendation letter from Father Ily, mentor to Patriarch Kirill, to enter an Orthodox theological institute. He attended high-level church events abroad, including a 2013 gathering in Malta, where church and political elites convened. Later, he broke with the Church, was denounced on Russian state television as a “fake monk,” and began reinventing himself as a critic of both the Orthodox establishment and the Russian government.
Father Artemiy
Father Iliy
Easter 2012, Moscow
Пасхальные звоны 16.04.2012.mp4Easter 2012, Red Square
Move to Italy, Residence, and Ties to Natalia Medved
Around 2016, Kirsanov relocated to Italy, where his sister also resides in Rome. His move coincided with the residence of Natalia Medved, a wealthy Russian émigré known for inheriting assets from a former marriage and running fashion and lingerie businesses linked to Russia.
Open data confirms that Sergey Kirsanov is officially tied to structures around the Catholic parish of Santa Inocenza in Coriano. Cadastral records show that he resides for free on land co-owned by the parish priest, Don Lanfranco Bellavista, making this a personal arrangement rather than a purely parish matter. At the same time, Italian business filings reveal that Kirsanov registered his commercial entity at the address of Piccola Famiglia, an organization linked to the parish and involved in immigrant assistance.
When first asked about these ties, Don Lanfranco categorically denied any connection between Kirsanov and the parish. But when presented with official documents proving both the property link and the business registration, he refused to clarify further, stating only that since we identify ourselves as volunteers, he is not obliged to respond.
The contradiction between his denials and the documented facts, combined with his unwillingness to explain, makes the situation appear not only opaque but deeply suspicious.
Medved herself has been listed in Myrotvorets, the Ukrainian database of pro-Russian figures, not only for her political positions but also for alleged connections to Russian special services. Online traces suggest long-standing links between Kirsanov, his family, and Medved, visible in social media interactions that went private after investigative attention.
Additional inquiries into Medved’s past further illustrate this pattern of secrecy. Her former partner, Salvatore Pasqualino, with whom she reportedly lived in Coriano around 2014–2015, was contacted multiple times via Telegram, WhatsApp, and email. Despite repeated attempts, he has never replied. After one such email inquiry — which included references to both Medved and Kirsanov as well as links to Myrotvorets entries — Medved abruptly locked down her social media accounts. Her Instagram, previously public, was switched to private, and older content was removed or cleaned. Similar activity was observed on her Facebook. These defensive actions suggest a conscious effort to obscure past connections once scrutiny began.
The Rimini Greek Orthodox Church also confirmed awareness of Kirsanov, noting that Medved had introduced him there. Medved herself sang in the choir at the parish. Clergy and members recalled him as an unpleasant and socially distant figure. When introduced, he claimed to be affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate, though he later denied ever having church ties. This contradiction further reinforces the perception of dishonesty in his personal narrative.
Medved with Kirsanov, Riccione
padre-serafino_NJUdzTpc.mp4Coversation with Orthodox Church in Rimini
Salvatore Pasqualino
Political Overbranding and Opportunism
Kirsanov first appeared in the Russian political blogosphere around 2019, presenting himself as a
strong supporter of Alexei Navalny. Observers suggest that his eventual turn against the opposition may have stemmed from frustration at not being admitted into its higher circles. His commentary shifted to harsh denunciations, mocking the same movement he once endorsed.
Notably, before 2022 Kirsanov rarely addressed Ukraine at all — avoiding mention of Crimea, even though his grandmother lived there until her recent death. Despite being listed as a foreign agent in Russia, he reportedly managed to inherit and sell his grandmother’s Crimean apartment.
Navalny
Milov
Spanish Media Mirage
When Kirsanov’s name suddenly began popping up in Spanish newspapers like El País and Público, it looked like the world was finally paying attention to the “persecuted cleric” in exile. But a closer look tells a different story. All the coverage traces back to the same author — Ferran Barber — who repeats Kirsanov’s own tall tales almost word for word. In one piece, Kirsanov proclaims undying love for “Mother Russia” while posing as a threat so dangerous that the Moscow Patriarchate supposedly trembles at his sermons. In another, he dreams aloud of returning home in glory. None of it is fact-checked, none of it corroborated. When asked directly how he verified Kirsanov’s story, Barber admitted he hadn’t. The pattern smells less like journalism and more like paid placement — articles bought to polish a self-made myth.
Something doesn’t add up — and here’s where the cracks show.
Example 1
Example 1
Claim in Público
Kirsanov is such a threat that the Russian Orthodox Church trembles at his antisystem sermons.
Reality Check
The Moscow Patriarchate never recognized him as clergy — he’s officially listed among the false priests. Now, in a twist, Kirsanov claims he was never connected to the Church at all. His myth of being a persecuted cleric collapses under his own contradictions.
Example 2
Example 2
Claim in El País
He dreams of returning to “Mother Russia,” the homeland he loves despite persecution.
Reality Check
In reality, he’s comfortably settled in Coreano, near Rimini (Italy), while reinventing himself yet again — now claiming to be Jewish and reportedly working on a Jewish passport. The “Mother Russia” devotion is just another mask he puts on when convenient.
Example 3
Example 3
Claim in Público
Spanish press presents him as a dissident cleric in exile, with a following rivaling Moscow’s.
Reality Check
He has even boasted of running a monastery and leading an Orthodox community — but in the Italian town where he is registered, no such monastery or community exists. All Spanish coverage came from a single journalist, Ferran Barber, who admitted he did no fact-checking. The “community” is pure invention.
This one is just the cherry on top
Ukraine and Failed Media Entry
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Kirsanov abruptly rebranded himself as one of the loudest pro-Ukrainian voices among Russian émigrés. His streams and posts denounced the Kremlin and expressed solidarity with Ukraine. Yet behind the scenes, he was reportedly trying aggressively to enter Ukrainian media circles. He reached out to bloggers and public figures such as Sternenko, Chekalkin, Sokolova, Fashik Donetskiy, Ukropchik seeking interviews and collaborations. Multiple Ukrainian activists declined, sensing inconsistencies in his persona.
By summer 2023, the shift was complete: his rhetoric flipped into concentrated hate speech against Ukraine, recycling Kremlin propaganda lines and mocking Ukrainian resistance.
👆🏼 Is he threatening Ukranians here? Looks like it.
Spit.mp4I will spit into your dirty ukranian face
Sharovary.mp4Ukranians are fucking stupid animals
Ukrainians are a nation of dumbfucks..mp4Ukranians - nation of dumb bastards
Expansion into Global Hate Narratives
Alongside anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, Kirsanov has embraced additional ideological postures:
- Promotion of Radio Genoa, a far-right extremist propaganda outlet.
- Sudden adoption of a strong pro-Israel identity, declaring Jewish roots while ignoring or justifying Israeli military actions in Gaza.
- Hateful rhetoric against Palestinians and Arabs, framing them — and Muslims more broadly — as existential threats to Europe.
- Apocalyptic claims that Europe is collapsing under migration and Islamization, a familiar trope in far-right discourse.
These shifts mirror his earlier pattern: adopting positions that generate maximum visibility, while discarding previous identities (Navalny supporter, Ukrainian ally, Orthodox dissident) once they no longer serve him.
RadioGenoa [sub].mp4Promoting RadioGenoa
kirk-blm-lefties_r7B2veOQ.mp4A raw example of extremist rhetoric mixing racism, hate, and conspiracy theories. Original video
Signs of a Coordinated Network
Investigative monitoring shows that Kirsanov is not acting alone. He appears to be embedded within a wider online network of Russian émigré propagandists. For instance, his narratives often align closely and in near-real time with bloggers such as Semen Skrepetsky in Poland and Jelena Vasiljeva in Finland. The repetition of identical talking points across borders suggests coordination rather than coincidence. This pattern indicates that Kirsanov is part of a structured propaganda ecosystem. Natalia Medved’s role in this network remains opaque. Unlike Kirsanov, she does not actively maintain a visible online persona, yet her introductions and connections position her as a possible facilitator or higher-ranking operative within this circle.
Style and Strategy
Kirsanov’s political overbranding follows a predictable cycle:
1. Attach himself to a movement (Orthodox Church, Navalny opposition, Ukrainian resistance).
2. Attempt to climb its ranks.
3. When blocked, turn hostile and reinvent himself as a critic.
4. Adopt new narratives that maximize relevance and controversy.
His stylistic trademarks — profanity, sarcasm, and dramatic reversals presented as revelations — sustain his image as a “lone truth-teller,” even as his positions consistently align with propaganda networks.
Conclusion
Sergey Kirsanov’s trajectory is a study in opportunism. From obscure origins in Orthodox circles to émigré networks in Italy, from Navalny ally to Kremlin mouthpiece, his story illustrates how personal reinvention can serve as a vehicle for propaganda. His embrace of shifting identities — oppositionist, pro-Ukrainian, now pro-Kremlin and anti-Arab — underscores not ideological conviction but a search for visibility, influence, and perhaps protection within powerful networks. In the end, Kirsanov does not represent independence or dissidence. He represents a new kind of propaganda entrepreneur: one who thrives on instability, contradictions, and the monetization of hate.
🚨 IMPORTANT!
🚨 IMPORTANT!
You can autotranslate to italian,copy and paste information from this page when contacting Italian authorities. Be sure to tag them on social media to increase visibility.
Below are screenshots of his quotes from social networks, along with links to Italian authorities and organizations.
Do not be intimidated by insolent Russian imperialists who confuse freedom of speech with impunity and arrogance. They live with the groundless conviction that the world revolves around them, that everyone secretly supports them, and that they can spit on laws as they have done for years.
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📢 Please report these violations via social media and email:
Comune di Coriano
✉️ l.sirri@comune.coriano.rn.it
✉️ staff.sindaco@comune.coriano.rn.it
🔗https://comune.coriano.rn.it/
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Gruppo Abele
✉️ centralino@gruppoabele.org
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